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Abstract
Background: The use of electric vehicles (EVs) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technologies have been advocated as an
efficient way to reduce the intermittency of renewable energy sources in smart grids. However, operating on V2G
sessions in a cost-effective way is not a trivial task for EVs. The formation of coalitions among EVs has been proposed
to tackle this problem.
Methods: In this paper we introduce Dynamic Constrained Coalition Formation (DCCF), which is a distributed
heuristic-based method for constrained coalition structure generation (CSG) in dynamic environments. In our
approach, coalitions are formed observing constraints imposed by the grid. To this end, EV agents negotiate the
formation of feasible coalitions among themselves.
Results: Based on experiments, we show that DCCF is efficient to provide good solutions in a fast way. DCCF
provides solutions whose quality approaches 98% of the optimum. In dynamically changing scenarios, DCCF also
shows good results, keeping the agents payoff stable along time.
Conclusions: Essentially, DCCF’s main advantage over traditional CSG algorithms is that its computational effort is
very lower. On the other hand, unlike traditional algorithms, DCCF is suitable only for constraint-based problems.
Keywords: Artificial intelligence; Game theory; Multiagent systems; Smart grids
Introduction
Electric power is an essential resource for modern soci-
eties. Strategic sectors of economy, such as telecommu-
nications, transportation and industrial activities directly
depend on electricity. Electricity networks, or, as called,
grids, play a key role on making energy available. Roughly
speaking, the electricity network is the infrastructure that
connects energy producers to energy consumers.
Despite its importance, electricity grids have evolved
very little since they were created. The energy demand,
in turn, has grown manifold. In order to meet such a
demand, the energy industry has invested mostly in the
construction of large power plants. However, such policies
resulted in non-redundant grids, which strongly depend
on non-renewable, highly polluting energy sources, whose
availability is becoming increasingly scarce. As a con-
sequence, such an infrastructure has lost efficiency and
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safety. Moreover, the demand for reliable, uninterrupted
energy supply increases steadily.
In this scenario, the concept of smart grids emerges.
According to the US Department of Energy [1], smart grid
is a fully automated electricity network, which intensively
monitors and controls every element that composes it,
being able to supply energy in an efficient and reliable way.
One of the main features of a smart grid is the bidirec-
tional flow of energy and communication between its ele-
ments. Along these lines, any element can both supply and
consume energy so that, e.g., households with own power
generation capacity can sell their surplus production to
the grid.
An interesting concept that has emerged in the field of
smart grids is the vehicle-to-grid (V2G). Through V2G
sessions, electric vehicles (EVs) can provide part of the
energy available in their batteries to the grid [2]. Such
mechanism is important in situations where the grid relies
on intermittent renewable energy sources, such as wind
and solar. Thus, the energy stored in the EVs’ batteries
can be used when supply is not able to meet the demand.
© 2014 Ramos et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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Additionally, EVs can make a profit by selling their energy
on V2G sessions.
Although the V2Gmechanism has several advantages to
the grid, participating in V2G sessions in a cost-effective
way is not a trivial task for EVs. According to the authors
in [3], to act in V2G sessions, EVs must commit to provide
a given amount of energy. However, when operating in an
isolated way, EVs are not able to fulfil their commitment
due to their insufficient energy capacity and unpredictable
availability. In order to address this problem, a particularly
interesting approach is the formation of coalitions among
EVs, forming virtual power plants (VPPs) [4-7]. By oper-
ating in coalitions, EVs can coordinate in order to provide
more accurate predictions about their energy availabil-
ity. Furthermore, the amount of available energy is also
increased. Therefore, coalition formation has shown to be
an effective way of increasing the profitability of EVs [2,3].
Coalition formation is a research topic that has recently
received great attention in the field of multiagent systems.
A coalition can be defined as a group of agents that decide
to cooperate in order to achieve a common goal. Accord-
ing to the authors in [8], coalition formation includes three
activities: coalition structure generation (CSG), solving
the optimization problem of each coalition and division of
the obtained value among the agents. Among these activ-
ities, CSG is the most interesting one for the multiagent
systems community.
Traditional CSG algorithms [8-10] deal not only with
grouping agents but also grouping them in order to obtain
the greatest possible reward. Such activity, however, has
been proven to be NP-complete [8]. Moreover, traditional
CSG algorithms do not deal with dynamically changing
scenarios. In this paper, our focus is not on finding the
optimal solution, but on finding a good one (in a rea-
sonable amount of time) in dynamic environments, i.e.,
environments that change constantly (agents can enter or
leave the system). We remark that traditional methods for
CSG do not deal with this issue.
In this paper we propose the formation of coali-
tions among EVs in order to form VPPs. As stated in
[2,3], by forming coalitions, EVs can increase their effi-
ciency and, consequently, their profitability. Therefore,
we present a distributed heuristic-based method for CSG
in dynamic environments, called Dynamic Constrained
Coalition Formation (DCCF henceforth), which is able to
prevent constrained agents to form a coalition. DCCF was
designed to run in a distributed way, in order to be fast
and to provide reasonably good solutions. We show that
compared to state of the art CSG algorithms, DCCF out-
performs them by many orders of magnitude, providing
solutions whose average quality nears 98% of the opti-
mal (with a standard deviation of 1.4%) in all tested cases.
In more dynamic environments, DCCF also shows good
results, being able to keep the agents’ payoff sufficiently
stable over time. Also, agents which joined coalitions have
obtained a higher profit than isolated agents. In essence,
DCCF’s main advantage over traditional CSG algorithms
is that its computational effort is very low. On the other
hand, unlike traditional CSG algorithms, DCCF is suitable
only for constraint-based problems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In ‘Background on coalition formation’ subsection, we
give more details about coalition formation. Related work
about coalition formation in smart grids is discussed
in ‘Coalitions in smart grids’ subsection. In ‘Problem
modelling’ and ‘Dynamic constrained coalition formation’
subsections, we present the problem modelling and our
method, respectively. Then in ‘Results and discussion’
subsection, we present the experiments and analysis of
our approach. Conclusions and future work directions are
presented in ‘Conclusions’ section.
Background on coalition formation
In this section we briefly present the background of coali-
tion formation. The organization of agents in an efficient
way is a major challenge in multiagent systems. Accord-
ing to Horling and Lesser [11], different organizational
paradigms can be used in order to coordinate agents.
Among these, coalition formation stands out. A coalition
is a group of agents that cooperate to achieve a common
goal, aiming to improve their performance. Specifically,
given a set of agents A = {1, 2, ..., a}, a subset of it is
denominated a coalition C. The partition of the set A
into disjoint and exhaustive coalitions is called a coalition
structure (CS) [8]. In the literature, coalition formation
is commonly studied in the form of characteristic func-
tion games (CFGs). In CFGs, a characteristic function
v : 2a → R assigns a value v(C) to each coalition C ⊆ A.
Likewise, the value of a coalition structure CS is given by
V (CS) =∑C∈CS v(C).
Regarding characteristic functions, two important con-
cepts are superadditivity and subadditivity [8]. A char-
acteristic function is superadditive if any pair of disjoint
coalitions C′ and C′′ is better off by merging into one
coalition, i.e., v(C′ ∪ C′′) ≥ v(C′) + v(C′′). On the other
hand, a characteristic function is subadditive if all agents
are better off by operating in an isolated way, i.e., v(C′ ∪
C′′) < v(C′) + v(C′′). In this paper, the focus is neither in
superadditive nor subadditive games, since they represent
trivial solutions [8].
As previously stated, coalition formation includes three
activities. Among these, CSG has drawnmore attention of
the multiagent systems community. In CSG, the aim is to
find the optimal coalition structure, i.e., the one with the
highest value, which is commonly referred as CS∗. How-
ever, there is a scalability issue: the number of possible
coalitions is 2a−1 and of coalition structures is asymptot-
ically in the order of O(aa) and ω(aa2 ) [8]. Furthermore,
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Sandholm et al. [8] have proved that this problem is NP-
complete. Many methods have been proposed in order to
solve this problem based on heuristics [12], dynamic pro-
gramming [10], or in the use of anytime algorithms [9],
some of which are discussed next.
Concerning anytime algorithms, Rahwan et al. [9] pro-
posed an integer-partition based algorithm (IP), which
uses branch-and-bound techniques. IP is based on an effi-
cient search space representation, where coalitions are
grouped by their sizes (in coalition lists) and coalition
structures are grouped by the size of coalitions they have
(called configurations). IP is divided into three stages:
pre-processing (establishes initial bounds on every con-
figuration); choosing the best configuration (bounds are
recalculated, the best configuration is selected for the
next stage and configurations with low upper bound are
pruned); finding the best CS in the chosen configura-
tion. Such approach has to search O(aa) coalition struc-
tures in the worst case. Recently, we have proposed a
pre-processing phase for IP called CPCSG (acronym to
constraint-based pruning of coalition structures graph)
[13]. In such approach, domain information is used in
order to identify infeasible coalitions, which allows the
pruning of the search space before the search is started by
IP. In the worst case, however, the search space remains
O(aa).
With respect to dynamic programming approaches, the
state of the art is represented by the improved dynamic
programming algorithm (IDP) [10]. The IDP algorithm
uses basically the same idea as DP [14], which was orig-
inally proposed to solve the set partitioning problem. It
works by solving each possible coalition, i.e., deciding
whether it is better to split it into two small coalitions or to
keep it as it is. Based on this, two tables are kept in mem-
ory: f1 (the solution of each coalition) and f2 (the value of
each solution). After the two tables were filled, the optimal
coalition structure can be easily found. In terms of worst
case computational complexity, IDP (O(3a)) is better than
IP (O(aa)). IP, in turn, is able to return near-optimal solu-
tions anytime. We remark, however, that neither IP nor
IDP works on dynamic scenarios.
Other approaches have been proposed to solve the
CSG problem from different perspectives. Voice et al.
[15] propose an IDP-based algorithm that addresses
CSG in graph-constrained settings. Although faster than
IDP (under certain conditions), it remains unsuitable
for dynamic scenarios. Furthermore, despite being faster
than IDP, it still does not scale well for real problems.
Coalition formation in graph-constrained scenarios is also
addressed in the work of Chalkiadakis et al. [16]. Nonethe-
less, their work is much more concerned with payoff
division than CSG itself. Ueda et al. [17] proposed the use
of distributed constraint optimization (DCOP) instances
to solve the CSG problem. However, the focus of their
work is not to find optimal CSG solutions (the best CS),
but optimal DCOP solutions (the correct value of the
coalitions). Chalkiadakis and Boutilier [18] have proposed
a Bayesian model-based reinforcement learning frame-
work for repeated coalition formation under uncertainty.
Such approach, however, is more concerned with agents’
learning and decision-making and does not address the
CSG problem. Ramchurn et al. [19] study coalition forma-
tion in task-oriented domains. Their approach, nonethe-
less, is suitable for up to ten agents and does not address
CFGs.
Therefore, it is clear that traditional CSG methods are
not suitable for dynamic scenarios. To this respect, in this
work we propose a heuristic method, which is able to
tackle dynamic scenarios. Nevertheless, both IP and IDP
address the CSG problem as CFGs and provide optimal
solutions in general static cases. Thus, IP and IDP will be
used as comparison in our experiments.
Coalitions in smart grids
The use of coalitions in smart grids has been widely dis-
cussed in the multiagent systems community (see [20] for
overview). One of the main interests of the field has been
to increase the reliability of renewable energy production.
In [4], Chalkiadakis et al. propose coalition forma-
tion among distributed energy resources (DERs) to form
VPPs. DERs are renewable energy sources with small-
to-medium energy capacity, like wind turbines and solar
panels. Taking into account that renewable energy sources
are intermittent due to weather conditions, their approach
suggests grouping DERs in order to aggregate their pro-
duction, thus improving their reliability and efficiency.
The proposed mechanism incentivizes DERs to provide
accurate estimates of their energy production, rewarding
good ones. However, this approach has a primary focus
on mechanism design rather than on coalition formation,
disregarding how far the solution is from the optimal one.
Another approach is the one of Kamboj et al. [5], which
proposes the formation of coalitions among EVs in order
to operate in the regulation market. The goal of the regu-
lation market is to bring stability to the grid by ensuring
that it always meets the demand. The regulation market
basically provides power to the grid whenever demand
exceeds supply, and store energy whenever supply exceeds
demand. To provide energy, the market usually depends
on large batteries (can readily store and supply energy, but
are very expensive) and generators (can generate energy,
but they are very polluting and take some time to start
working). Thus, considering that vehicles remain parked
96% of the time [2], the use of EVs’ batteries would help
to reduce costs and to improve efficiency of the regula-
tion market. However, such approach addresses coalition
formation in an ad hoc fashion, disregarding the solution
quality.
Ramos et al. Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society 2014, 20:8 Page 4 of 15
http://www.journal-bcs.com/content/20/1/8
In the work of Mihailescu et al. [6], formation of coali-
tions among producers and consumers is proposed. In
their approach, producers who have an increased energy
availability are probabilistically selected to coordinate
coalitions. Such coordinators are responsible for invit-
ing other producers to join their coalitions. Consumers
join the coalitions whose energy profile is more similar to
theirs and also based on their proximity. However, their
approach neither addresses coalition formation as CFGs
nor cares about the solution quality.
The formation of coalitions among producers and con-
sumers is also addressed in [7], specifically, among wind
turbines and EVs, also forming VPPs. The goal here is
more specific: solve the problem of intermittent power
generation of the wind turbines through the use of EVs’
batteries, in order to increase the reliability of this kind
of energy. To this end, a payment scheme to incentivize
EVs to join a VPP of wind turbines was deployed. How-
ever, aspects concerning the coalition formation problem
are not taken into account.
Other multiagent-based approaches have been pro-
posed in the domain of smart grids. The works of Gerding
et al. [21] and Vandael et al. [22] are both concerned
with coordinating the EVs’ recharging process in order to
avoid overloading the electricity network. However, such
a problem differs from the V2G one. Moreover, coalition
formation is not addressed in these works.
Therefore, it is clear that existing works have primarily
focused on applications of smart grids than on coalition
formation itself. Although our approach does not neces-
sarily find the optimal solution, it formulates the problem
using the CSG formalism, addressing it as a CFG and pro-
viding empirical analysis about the solution quality. In this




The scenario presented in our work consists in a smart
grid where EV agents sell their surplus energy in V2G ses-
sions. As previously discussed, singleton EVs are unable
to operate in a cost-effective way [3]. Thus, forming coali-
tions among EVs represents a suitable approach to solve
this issue. In this work, the grid incentivizes the formation
of coalitions among EVs through a monetary value, which
is proportional to the coalition’s power rating, up to cer-
tain limits. We assume that the grid is always willing to
buy the energy offered by EVs, i.e., whenever an EV has
energy to be sold, the grid will buy it.
Regarding the dynamic aspect of the problem, EVs can
enter or leave the system at any time. This is not just
a modelling definition but a real aspect of the domain.
Actually, the EVs’ permanency in the grid is ruled by
their owners’ preferences. Specifically, EVs should ensure
a minimum energy reserve so as to meet their owners’
demand. Thereby, we simplify such a requirement, assum-
ing that EV agents know when to stop selling energy to
the grid. At this point, EVs are allowed to leave the sys-
tem as soon as they deem necessary. Although it might be
argued that this behaviour would invalidate the EVs’ com-
mitment with the grid, such aspects are out of the scope of
this work. Here, the focus is only on finding a near-optimal
CSs. Thus, this issue could be better explored in a future
work.
A further assumption must be made. As discussed in
[13], EVs should supply energy only to consumers who
are in the same region as them (or just close enough).
Such a constraint exists because power lines have a lim-
ited energy flow capacity. Considering thatmultiple power
lines may be used in order to supply energy to a single
consumer, travelling long distances may impose a huge
burden on the distribution network. Therefore, the dis-
tancea among the EVs is a constraint that must be taken
into account while the coalitions are being formed. Specif-
ically, EVs must form coalitions only with EVs that are
close enough. A coalition that fits into such criterion is
said a feasible coalition. More formally, Equation 1 holds
for all feasible coalitions, where C is a coalition, i and j
are agents of coalition C, dij is the distance between agents
i and j, and α is the maximum distance that is allowed
between the agents of a given coalition. On this basis, Def-
inition 1 can be formulated. Importantly, the maximum
distance α must be defined by the grid itself, in order to
better represent the capacity of its power lines.
∀i ∈ C,∀j ∈ C \ {i} (dij ≤ α) (1)
Definition (Feasible coalition). A feasible coalition is
one for which Equation 1 holds.
Another important definition is the one of neighbours.
In the context of this work, two agents are neighbours if
the distance between them is lower than α, as formulated
in Definition 2.
Definition (Neighbours). The neighbours of a given
agent i ∈ A are all agents j ∈ A \ {i} for whom dij is smaller
than α.
The problem can be represented by a graph, where
the agents are expressed by nodes and the neighbourhood
relation among them is represented by edges. An example
is presented in Figure 1. As seen, the neighbours of agent
1 are the agents 7 and 9. In this case, {1, 7, 9} is a feasible
coalition, because the agents 1, 7 and 9 are neighbours of
each other.
Based on the problem proposed in this work, our focus
is on EVs that are willing to participate on V2G sessions
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Figure 1 Graph representation of a randomly generated
scenario for ten agents. The nodes represent agents and arcs
represent a neighbourhood relation between two agents.
only. The proposed approach works as follows. Whenever
an EV is plugged into the smart grid, it automatically signs
in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network (see next paragraph).
Through the P2P network, EVs share personal informa-
tion with their neighbours (such as location, current coali-
tion and so on). Based on the shared information, the
agents can look for feasible coalitions within their neigh-
bourhoods, proposing the creation of the most valuable
one, which will increase its profit. Coalitions last until an
agent decides to leave it. Agents, in turn, remain in their
coalitions until a better one is proposed or until they are
plugged into the grid. We go further on each of these steps
in next subsection.
Concerning the P2P network, it is important to explain
its role in this work. Basically, the P2P network consists of
one hub and many leafs connected to it, similarly to the
Gnutella2 protocol. The topology of the used P2P network
is analogous to the proposed smart grid scenario. Hubs
are substations and leafs are EVs. A substation controls
the portion of the distribution network where the EVs are
in. In this way, the information shared by the agents on
the P2P network are their location, whether they are in a
coalition or not, and the value of their current coalition.
Through this information, an agent can improve its per-
formance, proposing only those coalitions that are most
likely to be accepted by its neighbours. As will be defined
in Definition 3, such coalitions are referred as potential
coalitions.
The P2P network is also used for communication pur-
poses, i.e., message exchange. Thus, the P2P network
can be seen as a communication layer, through which
the agents can share information and even communicate
among themselves. It is important to note that in order to
make the communication effective, the hub ensures that
the agents can reach their neighbours only, instead of all
agents. Therefore, the P2P network shows to be a suitable
way to ensure the communication among the agents. It is
noteworthy that the communication layer was modelled
to be a seamless interface among the agents. Although we
have modelled it like a P2P network, the protocol is not
an essential part of our approach. Thus, hereafter, we no
longer focus on P2P particularities.
Our approach can be formalized in the form of CFGs.
The value v(C) of a given coalitionC represents howmuch
the grid is willing to pay beyond the normal price for each
energy unit sold by the agents in that coalition. The coali-
tion value is a function of the coalition’s total power rating
(the greater, the better). The total power rating of a coali-
tion C is given by Equation 2, where wi is the power rating
of EV i. Thus, the value of coalitions can be seen as an





In this work only one kind of agent was defined, the EV.
The aim of the EV agents is to sell the surplus energy on
their batteries to the grid, getting the highest profit (pay-
off ) possible. It is worth noting that in our approach, v(C)
does not represent the payoff that is going to be divided
among all members of coalition C. Instead, it represents
how much incentive the agents of coalition C receive for
each energy unit sold by them. In this sense, the payoff
obtained by a given agent i ∈ C is the product of its power
rating wi and the value v(C) of its current coalition. Thus,
we can reformulate the agents’ objective as joining the
coalitions which have the highest values. Consequently,
the agents act selfishly, looking for the coalitions where
their energy will be more valuable. Along these lines,
the definition of a potential coalition can be completed
through Definition 3.
Definition (Potential coalition). A potential coalition is
one which is feasible and ∀i ∈ C (v(C) > v(Ci)), where Ci
is the current coalition of agent i.
As previously stated, the environment can be dynamic,
i.e., coalitions can be formed and terminated at any time.
In this sense, our model simplifies the agents’ payoff divi-
sion in a way that each agent is paid on every time
stepb based on the amount of energy it has sold to the
grid during that time step. This time-step payoff will be
referred to as instantaneous payoff hereafter.We highlight
that energy is measured in kilowatt hour (kWh)c. There-
fore, the instantaneous payoff of agent i can be obtained
through Equation 3:
Pi = wi ∗ v(C)60 . (3)
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Dynamic constrained coalition formation
Following themodelling discussed in the previous section,
we present DCCF, which is a distributed heuristic-based
method for constrained CSG in dynamic environments.
DCCF was designed to run distributed among the agents,
i.e., every agent in the environment runs an instance of
DCCF.
The DCCF method consists of several procedures.
The main procedure is detailed in the next subsec-
tion. The other procedures, which represent the coali-
tion negotiation phases, are detailed in next subsections.
Finally, an illustrative example is presented in the last
subsection.
Main procedure
DCCF’s main procedure has two parts. The first one,
which we will refer to as the simulation procedure
(Algorithm 1), was designed for controlling and setting
up the simulation. The simulation procedure formalizes
the dynamic aspect of the environment, making possi-
ble that agents enter or leave the simulation at any time.
On each iteration, several steps are performed. First, if a
new agent is created, its variables are initialized accord-
ing to Table 1 (lines 3 to 5 of Algorithm 1), as a part of
the P2P sign-in process. Second, the agents’ lists of neigh-
bours are updated every iteration (line 6), if required. Last
but not the least, all agents are called to run, on their
own, one iteration (line 8) of Algorithm 2. It is impor-
tant to note that iterations are not equivalent to time
steps.
The second part of main procedure refers to the agents’
execution and is presented in Algorithm 2. This procedure
is performed by each agent on each iteration of the sim-
ulation. Basically, it allows the agents to negotiate among
themselves to form potential coalitions. The negotiation
process takes place through information exchange among
the agents. Specifically, every agent is able to find potential
Table 1 Definitions of the procedures’ variables
Variable Description Initial value
i ID of the agent who is running
the procedure
(Agent ID)
Ni List of neighbours of agent i { j ∈ A \ {i} : dij ≤ α}
Ci Agent i’s coalition {i} (singleton)
C′i Coalition proposed by agent i
in phase 1
∅
C′′i Coalition accepted by agent i in
phase 2
∅
Minvi List of ‘invitation messages’
received by agent i
∅
Mrpli List of ‘replymessages’ received
by agent i
∅
Algorithm 1: Simulation procedure
1 while simulation is running do
// if some agent has entered or
left
2 if set A has changed then
3 foreach new agent i do
4 initialize i’s variables according to Table 1;
5 end
6 update Ni, ∀i ∈ A;
7 end
8 run i (Algorithm 2), ∀i ∈ A;
9 end
Algorithm 2: Agents’ execution procedure
// Neighbours invitation phase
1 if Ci = {i} and C′i = ∅ and C′′ = ∅ then
2 invite neighbours (Algorithm 3);
3 end
// Invitations processing phase
4 ifMinvi = ∅ then
5 process invitations (Algorithm 5);
6 end
// Replies processing phase
7 ifMrpli = ∅ and Ci = {i} and C′i = ∅ and C′′ = ∅ then
8 process replies (Algorithm 6);
9 end
coalitions (based on information shared by its neigh-
bours) and negotiate their formation (through message
exchange).
The coalition negotiation process is divided into three
phases:
• Neighbours invitation (lines 1 to 3 of Algorithm 2):
singleton agents propose potential coalitions to their
neighbours
• Invitations processing (lines 4 to 6 of Algorithm 2):
agents who have received invitations choose and
accept the best one
• Replies processing (lines 7 to 9 of Algorithm 2):
agents who proposed coalitions process the received
replies and form (or not) the coalitions
An illustrative example of these phases is presented in
Figure 2. In the first phase, agent 1 proposes to its neigh-
bours the formation of coalition {1, 7, 9}. In the second
phase, agents 7 and 9 evaluate the invitation and accept it.
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Figure 2 The coalitions negotiation process. In phase 1 the coalition is proposed, in phase 2 the coalition is analyzed and accepted, and in phase
3 the replies are processed and the coalition is formed.
Finally, in the third phase, agent 1 processes the received
replies and forms the initially proposed coalition.
The coalition negotiation phases are described in detail
in the following sections.
Neighbours invitation phase
The neighbours invitation phase, which is performed by
every agent i that is not in a coalition, is structured as
in Algorithm 3. The rationale behind this phase is sim-
ple: (i) search for feasible coalitions, (ii) sort out those
that are potential and (iii) invite neighbours to form the
best one. This phase is structured as in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Inviting neighbours
1 Fi ← Algorithm 4 ; // feasible coalitions
2 Pi ← ∅ ; // potential coalitions
3 foreach C ⊂ Fi do
4 foreach j ∈ C do
5 if Cj = {j} and v(Cj) ≥ v(C) then
6 C ← C \ {j};
7 end
8 end
9 if C = ∅ then
10 Pi ← Pi ∪ {C} ;
11 end
12 end
13 C′i ← argmaxC∈Pi v(C);
// send an invitation message to
agents in C′i
14 updateMinvj with C′i , ∀j ∈ C′i ;
Firstly, Algorithm 4 is used to find feasible coalitions,
by means of Definition 1, among i’s neighbours. Sec-
ond, potential coalitions are selected among the feasible
ones, based on Definition 3. Finally, the best poten-
tial coalition (i.e., the one that maximizes the agents
payoff ) might be selected and proposed by i to its
neighbours.
Invitations processing phase
In the invitations processing phase, agents must reason
about the best invitation to accept. The best invitation
received is the one that proposes the coalition with high-
est value. This procedure is presented in Algorithm 5.
Roughly speaking, the best invitation can be accepted if
Algorithm 4: Finding feasible coalitions
1 Fi ← ∅;
2 foreach j ∈ Ni do
3 Fi ← Fi ∪ {{i, j}};
4 foreach k ∈ Nj, k > j and k ∈ Ni do
5 foreach C ⊂ Fi do
6 if C \ Nk = ∅ then
7 C ← C ∪ {k};
8 else
9 Cnew ← (C \ (C \ Nk)) ∪ {k};
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Algorithm 5: Processing invitations
1 mˆ ← argmaxm∈Minvi v(m.coalition);
2 accept? ← false;
3 if C′i = ∅ then
4 if mˆ.coalition = C′i and mˆ.sender < i then
5 accept? ← true;
6 end
7 else if v(mˆ.coalition) > v(Ci) then
8 accept? ← true;
9 end
10 if accept? then
11 C′′ ← mˆ.coalition;
// accept invitation mˆ
12 updateMrplmˆ.sender ;
// reject remaining invitations
13 updateMrplm.sender , ∀m ∈ Minvi \ {mˆ};
14 else
// reject all invitations
15 updateMrplm.sender , ∀m ∈ Minvi ;
16 end
the corresponding coalition’s value is higher than one of i’s
current coalition (lines 7 to 9).
One additional case must be handled. If agent i has
already proposed a coalition to its neighbours and, coin-
cidentally, the best invitation received is to form the same
coalition it has proposed. This case is called a mutual
invitation, since two (or more) agents are inviting each
other for the same coalition. To address this case, all
agents reply the invitation only to the agent with lowest
IDd (as in lines 3 to 6). This way, only the agent with lowest
ID will perform the third phase.
Finally, if a coalition has been accepted, then the agent
sends a message to the neighbour who has made the
invitation, notifying it about its choice (line 12). All non-
accepted invitations are rejected.
Replies processing phase
Finally, the replies processing phase is performed as in
Algorithm 6. Essentially, the coalition can be formed only
if all replies are positive, i.e., if all agents of the proposed
coalition have accepted the invitation. If there is a negative
reply, then the proposed coalition does not form.
In the event that the coalition is formed, the members’
P2P-shared information is updated. In order to simplify
the procedure, in this paper we entrusted the agent who
proposed (agent i) the coalition with this task (as lines
4 to 9). Additionally, agents who were already in coali-
tions must leave them to enter the new one (lines 5 to 7).
Importantly, agents who receive a cancellation or a coali-
tion finished message simply return to their initial state,
being able to perform phases 1 and 2 again.
Algorithm 6: Processing replies
1 if ∃mˆ ∈ Mrpli (mˆ.answer = “No′′) then
2 send a cancellation message to every agent i ∈ C′i ;
3 else
4 foreach j ∈ C′i do
5 if Cj = ∅ then
6 leave Cj (notify members of Cj);
7 end




In order to explain how DCCF works, we describe the
following example.
Assuming that the scenario is as in Figure 3, where there
are six agents. One of these agents is isolated (agent 1),
and the others are organized into two distinct coalitions:
C1 = {2, 5, 6} and C2 = {3, 4}. For simplicity, let us assume
in this example that the value of a coalition is a function
of its cardinality, i.e., v(C1) = 3 and v(C2) = 2 and that
individual agents value 0. Now suppose that agent 1 is new
in the system and that its neighbours are agents 2, 3 and 4.
After agent 1 has entered, the neighbours invita-
tion phase is started by agent 1. First, it identifies
the feasible coalitions: {1, 2} and {1, 3, 4}. By analyz-
ing the feasible coalition {1, 2}, agent 1 realizes that its
value (v({1, 2}) = 2) is lower than the value of agent
2’s current coalition (v({2, 5, 6}) = 3). Thus, {1, 2} is not
a potential coalition and can be discarded. The sec-
ond feasible coalition, {1, 3, 4}, in turn, has higher value
(v({1, 3, 4}) = 3) than of the current coalition of agents 3
Figure 3 Graph of an example scenario. The scenario consists of six
agents, where there are two coalitions (represented by the dashed
lines), namely, C1 = {2, 5, 6} and C2 = {3, 4} (whose values are
v(C1) = 3 and v(C2) = 2).
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and 4 (v({3, 4}) = 2). Based on that, {1, 3, 4} is a potential
coalition. Therefore, agent 1 invites agents 3 and 4 to form
the coalition {1, 3, 4}.
In the second iteration, agents 3 and 4 analyze the invi-
tation made by agent 1. As the value of the proposed
coalition is better than their current coalition, both decide
to join the coalition.
In the third iteration, agent 1 starts the replies process-
ing phase. As agents 3 and 4 have accepted the invitation,
then the coalition can be created. Thus, the coalition
{1, 3, 4} is created on iteration 3.
Results and discussion
In this section we compare DCCF against traditional CSG
approaches. We also evaluate DCCF’s performance in
dynamic environments.
Value assignment
In order to evaluate our approach, some issues must be
detailed. Initially, since this work focuses on character-
istic function games, it is essential to discuss how the
characteristic function was modelled. The characteristic
function is formulated through Equation 4, where δ is the
expected power rating of any coalition, and  defines the
maximum financial incentive the grid is willing to pay for
a given coalition,WC is the power rating of coalitionC has
available, and p is the normal price of an energy unit by
v(C) =
{
0, if ∃i ∈ C, ∃j ∈ C \ {i} (dij > α)
min{(WC
δ
)2 × , } × p, otherwise. (4)
Through the first line of Equation 4, the values of infea-
sible coalitions are set to zero. The second line, in turn,
assigns the value of feasible coalitions. This takes into
account their power ratingse WC (the greater WC , the
greater the coalition value). The  is used to allow the
grid to control the maximum value it wants to pay for an
energy unit. Finally, through δ the grid defines the desired
granularity of coalitions, i.e., the power rating the grid
desires each coalition has.
Regarding the values set to the parameters of the char-
acteristic function, the following was defined. Parameter 
was set to 0.9, i.e., the grid would pay up to 90% beyond the
normal price to a coalition.We assume that the grid would
like to form small VPPs, whose power rating is around 150
kW. On this basis, δ was set to 150. Finally, the normal
price of an energy unit, p, was set to R$0.50 (approxi-
mately the energy price per kilowatt hour in Brazil, in
Brazilian currency).
Types of experiments
In order to evaluate our approach, two sets of experi-
ments were made: in closed and in open world. In the
closed-world scenarios, no agents can enter or leave the
simulation after it has been started. The open-world sce-
narios, in turn, allow new agents to enter the simulation,
and existing agents to leave the simulation. The focus
of our approach is on open-world scenarios, which are
dynamic and more complex. However, in order to com-
pare our approach against other CSG algorithms (which
do not work on dynamic scenarios), the use of closed-
world scenarios is more suitable.
The agents were randomly positioned in a grid-based
scenario. Edges were created between pairs of agents
whose Euclidian distance was lower than α. For all sce-
narios tested, both in open and closed world settings, the
parameter α was set to 7. The distance here is measured
by cells. Indeed, one can imagine that each cell has 10×10
m, as adopted in [13].
The set of experiments was performed in an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7-2600 3.40 GHz PC, with 16 GB RAM and
Ubuntu 12.04 64 bits.
Closed-world settings
In closed-world settings, DCCF is compared against other
CSG approaches: IDP [10], IP [9] and CPCSG [13] in
terms of runtime and solution quality f.
Experiments were run for different number of agents
a = {10, 11, ..., 20}. For each number of agents, 30 differ-
ent scenarios were generated (as described in the ‘Value
assignment’ subsection). In order to accurately compare
the algorithms, each of them was tested in exactly the
same scenarios. Results are presented in Figure 4. In the
graph, each point shows the average runtime of the 30 sce-
narios and the error bars represent the standard deviation.
As can be observed in Figure 4, DCCF outperforms the
other algorithms in terms of runtime by many orders of
magnitude.While the average runtime of DCCFwas lower
than 1 s in all sets of experiments, in other algorithms the
average runtime increases exponentially with the number
of agents. For the sake of comparison, for 20 agents, the
IP algorithm takes on average about 6 h to run. DCCF, in
turn, takes less than 20 ms.
Now, we analyze how far the solution generated by
DCCF is from the optimum. Results are plotted in
Figure 5, where the DCCF points show how far the average
solutions are from the optimal ones. Results were normal-
ized in order to show the percentage achieved by DCCF
in relation to the optimum. Error bars plot the standard
deviation of each set of experiments. It is important to
note that the non-normalized curves behave in an ascend-
ing monotonic fashion (as a function of the number of
agents).
As shown in Figure 5, the results are very promising.
Although DCCF has taken less than 1 s to run, it was
able to find good solutions. In almost all tested cases,
the solutions generated by DCCF achieved more than
95% of the optimal solution. The average quality achieved
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Figure 4 Comparison of DCCF against IDP, IP and CPCSG. The runtime (in log scale) for different number of agents (from 10 to 20 agents) is
shown.
was approximately 98.1% (averaged over all experiments).
Also, the standard deviation was up to 1.4% in all experi-
ments, showing a tendency on producing good solutions.
Therefore, DCCF’s advantage over the other algorithms
is that it runs on a small amount of time, in dynamic
distributed environments, achieving good solutions in all
tested cases. Importantly, however, DCCF cannot be said
to always produce the same results for scenarios other
than those experimented here.
Open-world settings
In this section, we empirically evaluate DCCF in an open-
world setting. To this end, we have generated an initial
Figure 5 Quality of solution generated by DCCF. The percentage
of DCCF in comparison with the optimal solution (normalized), for
different number of agents (from 10 to 20 agents), is shown.
scenario with 40 agents (as described in the ‘Value assign-
ment’ subsection), which is used in the experiments along
this section (Figure 6).
Considering that the world is open, agents can enter and
leave in the simulation while it is running. The frequency
that such events occur is defined in terms of probabili-
ties. Specifically, the probability of a new agent entering
in the system in a given time step is defined by Pe. In the
same way, the probability of a given agent (selected uni-
formly random) leaving the system in a given time step is
defined by Pl. Based on these parameters, on every time
step a new agent is created with probability Pe; and with
probability Pl, a randomly selected agent is eliminated. In
the experiments, we have simulated a 24-h period, which
corresponds to 1,440 time steps.
In order to evaluate howDCCF behaves in different con-
ditions, three different settings are tested, all of them using
the same 40 agents’ initial scenario. In all cases, small val-
ues are set to parameters Pe and Pl, in order to avoid
fast changes in the environment. The three settings are
defined as follows:
• Setting 1, Pe = Pl = 0.005
• Setting 2, Pe = 0.02 and Pl = 0.005
• Setting 3, Pe = 0.005 and Pl = 0.02
In the first setting, both Pe and Pl have the same value
(0.005). In this sense, the number of agents tends to
remain the same along time. The variation in the number
of agents over time is shown in Figure 7. Indeed, as can
be observed, the number of agents remains stable. In this
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Figure 6 Initial scenario with 40 agents used in the open-world experiments.
case, the number of agents in the end of the simulation
was 42.
Concerning the value of the solutions, Figure 8 plots
the variation in the social welfare (the coalition struc-
ture value V (CS)) over time. The social welfare does not
experiment large variations. The greatest variations occur
when an agent leaves the system, as it can be observed by
comparing the graphs of Figures 7 and 8. Such behaviour
shows that DCCF is effective on organizing the agents into
coalitions.
In order to better understand such behaviour, we now
show the variation in the agents’ instantaneous payoff
along time (Figure 9). Recall that the instantaneous payoff
is obtained as in Equation 3. The average instantaneous
payoff also remains stable over time. Here it is important
to note that the instantaneous payoff is really low (less
than R$0.01). However, this is the received value in just 1
min. Moreover, the payoff considered in this CFG is the
value the grid pays beyond the normal price (as described
in the ‘Value assignment’ subsection). In this sense, after
the entire 24-h simulation, the average obtained payoff
was approximately R$4.47 per agent. Also, considering the
total profit (normal price + coalition price) obtained by
the agents, the average was of R$44.07. In this respect, an
agent that remained isolated throughout all simulation has
received only R$39.6. Therefore, agents that were in coali-
tions have received, on average, a profit 11.28% greater
than singleton agents.
Concerning the system stability, another important
point is the amount of time the coalitions last. Figure 10
Figure 7 Number of agents along time, for setting 1.
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Figure 8 Variation of V(CS) over time, for setting 1.
shows the instantaneous average duration of the coali-
tions. Whenever an agent enters or leaves the system,
new coalitions are created. As a consequence, the curve
drops significantly. The average duration of the coalitions
throughout the whole simulation was 384 time steps.
To conclude the experiments with the first setting,
Figure 11 shows the number of messagesg exchanged
along time. As expected, the amount of exchanged mes-
sages increases whenever an agent enters or leaves the
system.
Now we analyze the second setting, where Pl remains
with the same value as in setting 1, but Pe is increased
to 0.02, i.e., four times greater than Pl. In this way, it is
expected that the number of agents increases over time.
Indeed, this is what happens, as Figure 12 shows. In this
case, the simulation, which started with 40 agents, ended
up with 62 agents.
Concerning the agents’ payoff, Figure 13 presents the
average instantaneous payoff of the agents along time. The
behaviour of the instantaneous payoff curve is somewhat
less stable than in the case of setting 1. Obviously, this
occurs because, in setting 2, the entering of new agents
in the system is much more frequent. Consequently, there
are more coalitions being proposed and being accepted.
However, it can be noted that the payoff increases as
well. For the sake of comparison, in setting 1 the aver-
age payoff obtained by the agents throughout all simula-
tion was approximately R$4.47. In the case of setting 2,
this value is increased to R$7.72. This means that agents
who have joined coalitions obtained a 19.5% greater total
profit than singleton agents on average. Such behaviour
shows that value of the coalitions increase as they become
greater.
The other metrics analyzed in the case of setting 1
have the same behaviour for setting 2. Thus, we do not
repeat the plots. Rather, we go straight to setting 3, where
Pe = 0.005 and Pl = 0.02. In this way, the number of
agents over time is expected to decrease. These results are
depicted in Figure 14. In the case of setting 3, the final
number of agents (in the end of simulation) has dropped
by half.
Referring to the agents’ instantaneous payoff, it is shown
in Figure 15. As it can be observed, the instantaneous pay-
off in setting 3 is more stable than in setting 2 over time,
but is less stable than in setting 1. The reason for this
behaviour is that the stability of the payoff is more sen-
sitive to changes in the environment than to the number
of agents itself. In the case of setting 3, the average payoff
received by the agents throughout the whole simulation
was approximately 3.1, which corresponds to an average
profit of R$42.7. Considering that the profit obtained by
isolated agents was of R$39.6, agents in coalitions have
obtained a profit 7.8% greater on average. It is impor-
tant to note that, despite this value being lower than in
the other two settings, the average value over time is
barely affected during the simulation. In other words, the
agents are able to obtain a good payoff even with constant
changes in the environment.
Figure 9 Variation in the agents’ payoff along time, for setting 1. Average instantaneous (left vertical axis) and accumulated (right vertical axis)
payoff of agents are shown.
Ramos et al. Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society 2014, 20:8 Page 13 of 15
http://www.journal-bcs.com/content/20/1/8
Figure 10 Average instantaneous duration of coalitions along time, for setting 1.
Figure 11 Amount of messages exchanged among the agents over time, for setting 1.
Figure 12 Number of agents along time, for setting 2.
Figure 13 Variation in the agents’ payoff along time, for setting 2. Average instantaneous (left vertical axis) and accumulated (right vertical
axis) payoff of agents are shown.
Figure 14 Number of agents along time, for setting 3.
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Figure 15 Variation in the agents’ payoff along time, for setting 3. Average instantaneous (left vertical axis) and accumulated (right vertical
axis) payoff of agents are shown.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented DCCF, a distributed
method for constrained CSG in smart grids. The pro-
posed approach works by allowing agents to negotiate
the formation of coalitions among themselves. On this
basis, the agents can propose coalitions to their neigh-
bours or be invited to join a coalition proposed by
them.
Based on these experiments, we showed that DCCF is
really effective in providing good solutions in a fast, dis-
tributed way. We showed that compared to state-of-the-
art algorithms, our approach outperforms them in terms
of runtime performance by several orders of magnitude,
providing solutions whose quality was on average 98.1%
of the optimum in tested cases (with standard deviation
of 1.4%). In dynamic environments, DCCF also showed
good results, being able to keep the agents’ payoff suf-
ficiently stable over time. Also, through experiments we
showed that compared to isolated agents, the agents who
joined coalitions have obtained a higher profit. However, it
is important to note that although the results are promis-
ing, when compared to other approaches, DCCF is not
as generic as them. IP and IDP, for instance, return opti-
mal solutions. Additionally, with an increased number
of neighbours (more dense graphs), the agents can take
longer to find good results.
For future work, we would like to investigate how the
distance constraint could be replaced by a more robust
one. In this work, the agent constraints are governed
by the physical distance among them. However, more
robust alternatives could be used. For example, in order
to group agents by the compatibility of their energy pro-
files, a similarity function could be used. Also, the model
could be extended to include more than one kind of
constraint.
Another promising future direction would be to extend
the model to handle agent uncertainties, e.g., regarding
availability. In such scenarios, penalties could be imposed
on coalitions that do not fulfil their commitment with
the grid. Machine learning techniques could be used
to allow the agents to predict their owners’ behaviour.
Additionally, reputation mechanisms could be used to
rank the agents based on their predictions.
Finally, some changes could be made in the modelling.
First, having not just one constraint, but a few, would be
a more realistic and interesting approach. Second, agents
that are in coalitions could be always checking whether
a better coalition is available or not. Probabilistic models
could also be incorporated to this end. Finally, other kinds
of DERs could be incorporated into the model, allowing
the formation of heterogeneous coalitions.
Endnotes
a The distance metric does not play an important role
in this work. Anyway, geographical distance is a
reasonable approximation (in the absence of a better one)
for this problem. In real situations, it can be trivially
replaced by another one.
b In this work, each time step corresponds to 1 min.
c By definition, a power rating of 1 kW over 1 h
produces 1 kWh of energy.
d In real situations, the ID could be easily replaced by
any other comparable code, such as the vehicle’s license
plate.
e The power ratingWC is obtained from Equation 2.
The power rating wi was set to 3.3 kW for all agents
i ∈ A. Such a value was adopted considering that this is
the energy transfer rate of some commercial EVs.
f Since DCCF finds near-optimal solutions, a
comparison against the optimal ones is a useful metric to
measure its performance.
g In order to improve the visualization of Figure 11, the
vertical axis range was set between 0 and 150. In the very
beginning, around 300 messages were exchanged.
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